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Executive Summary
The spectacular growth of the software industry in some non-G7 economies
has aroused both interest and concern. This paper addresses two sets of interre-
lated issues. First, we explore the determinants of success in software in emerg-
ing economies. We then touch on the broader issue of the lessons, if any, that
can be applied to economic development more generally.
From the U.S. perspective, we think that the interesting debate is not the
current one about the impact of outsourcing on jobs, but instead the one about
whether offshoring of software is a long-term threat to American technological
leadership. We conclude that policymakers in the United States should not fear
the growth of new software-producing regions. Instead, the U.S. economy will
broadly benefit from their growth. U.S. technological leadership rests in part
on the continued position of the United States as the primary destination for
highly trained and skilled scientists and engineers from the world over.
Though this leadership position is likely to persist for some time, the increasing
attractiveness of foreign emerging-economy destinations is a long-term con-
cem for continued U.S. technological leadership.
I.Introduction
One rather unexpected phenomenon of the 1990s has been the spectac-
ular growth of the software industry in some non-G7 economies. The
first element of surprise is that these countries are not where one
would expect to see the growth of what is commonly thought of as a
high-tech industry. The second element is that the 1990s have shown
not just growth of the industry but remarkable growth. In India, for ex-
ample, software production was almost nonexistent in the early 1980s.
Today, the software industry employs more than 250,000 employees,
sustaining annual growth rates of 30 to 40 percent in revenues and em-
ployinent over more than ten years. Although less remarkable than2 Arora and Gambardella
India, countries like Ireland and Israel have also had double-digit
growth.
This paper addresses two sets of interrelated issues. First, we explore
the determinants of these successful stories. We then touch on the
broader issue of the lessons, if any, that can be learned for economic
development more generally. Second, the Indian, Irish, and Israeli soft-
ware industries export a substantial fraction of their output (and ser-
vices) to advanced economiesparticularly the United States. A heated
debate exists in the United States regarding the desirabifity of out-
sourcing, and the debate follows the familiar free trade versus jobs
line. Rather than join this debate, we prefer to focus on a related one
that is arguably of greater long-term significance. We ask specifically
whether the growth of the software industry in emerging economies is
beneficial for the United States, and what that growth means for the
technological leadership of the United States in the long term.
In the next section, we discuss the growth of the software industry in
five newcomer regionsIndia, Ireland, Israel, Brazil, and China. This
discussion is based on the results of a two-year international project
that led to our forthcoming volume (Arora and Gambardella 2005).
The five comparisons provide an interesting basis for our discussion
because the growth of India, Ireland, and Israel has been fueled by
exports, but China and Brazil have grown largely thanks to their do-
mestic market. From the evidence collected for these countries, we
then discuss in Section ifi some of the reasons why they have been suc-
cessful in software. In Section IV, we discuss some of the implications
of this growing international division of labor for the U.S. economy.
Section V takes the Indian point of view. One effect in particular must
be assessed more carefully: the large outflow of human capital from In-
dia. We discuss the pros and cons of these flows for both India and the
United States. Section VI discusses whether the patterns in the growth
of software in our five countries can provide lessons for other emerg-
ing economies, in software or in the information technology (IT) in-
dustries more generally. Section VII summarizes some of the policy
implications of our analysis; Section VIII concludes by providing some
broad considerations on the topic.
II.The Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel
During the 1990s, India, Ireland, and Israel emerged as significant soft-
ware exporters. In the same period, Brazil and China also developedThe Globalization of the Software Industry 3
Table 1.1
The software industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel compared to the United
States, Japan, and Germany (2002 or latest available figures)
Data compiled from various sources.
b2000
cThe software development index is the ratio between software sales over GDP (in %)
and the GDP per capita of the country (in 000 $US) (See also Boteiho et al. 2005.)
an extensive software sector relying largely on the domestic market
and are now attempting to move to exports.' Table 1.1 shows that in
2002, the Indian and Chinese industries were of comparable size ($12.5
and $13.3 billion, respectively), while the 2001 sales of Brazil and Israel
were $7.7 and $4.1 biffion, respectively. The Irish industry reached
$13.9 billion in total sales in 2002, of which $12.3 bfflion is attributed to
multinational companies (MNCs) and $1.6 billion to the indigenous
sector.2
The employment differences among our five countries are more
marked than those in sales. In March 2003, the Indian software indus-
try employed about 250,000 people.3 The 2000 figures for China and
Brazil are about 160,000 and 190,000, respectively. As noted, 2002 em-
ployment in the Irish software industry was about 28,000 (15,300 and
12,600, respectively, for MNCs and indigenous firms), while 2001 em-
ployment in the Israeli industry was about 15,000. To put these figures
in perspective, employment in the U.S. software industry was slightly
above 1 million, with sales of around $200 billion; the comparable
figures for Japan were 534,000 and $85 bfflion.4 Germany, the third
largest software producer, employed around 300,000 and had sales
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notable differences in the sales per employee, with Israel having the
highest sales per employee, followed by Ireland, whose figures are
only slightly lower than the figures for Germany. The revenue per em-
ployee of the Indian industry in 2002 was about $50,000, which is com-
parable to figures for China and Brazil.
The picture that emerges from these figures is consistent with the
stylized facts. The Israeli software industry is largely product- and
research-and-development-oriented. The software industry in Brazil,
China, and India is of a lower value added; it is heavily service-
oriented in India. Ireland is in between, with a handful of product-
oriented firms, and several small consultancies and niche firms.
Table 1.1 also shows that in Brazil and China, software sales are be-
tween 1 and 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), only slightly
smaller than the corresponding figures for richer countries such as the
United States, Japan, and Germany.6 The software share of GDP is
higher in Israel (3.7 percent) and India (2.5 percent). The shares for
India and China have also increased substantially in recent years,
while they have remained more stable for the other countries. In 2001,
the GDP share of software was only 0.6 percent in China and 1.7 per-
cent in India. Thus, in these two economies, software has continued to
grow faster than GDP in 200 1-2002, despite the general slowdown in
the IT sector worldwide. In all five countries, software ranks high
when compared to their overall level of development, as measured by
the ratio between the software share of GDP and the GDP per capita
(Boteiho et al. 2005). In all five emerging countries, these ratios are far
higher than those in the United States, Germany, and Japan, suggest-
ing a specialization in software. The level of the index is particularly
impressive for India (about ten to twenty times higher than the levels
in the United States, Japan, and Germany).
But the most impressive figures about the software industry in these
emerging economies are their growth rates, which have ranged as
high as 40 percent per year in the Indian case (table 1.2, column 2).
The number of firms has also grown. In India, the membership of Na-
tional Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM)
increased from around 100 in 1990 to 797 in 2000 (Athreye 2005). Simi-
larly, the number of new Irish software firms increased from less than
300 in 1991 to 760 in 2000 (Sands 2005). Botelho et al. (2005) report
that out of a sample of 685 Brazilian software firms in existence in
2001, a little less than one-third (210) were founded between 1996 and
2000, and a slightly larger fraction (221) were founded between 1991
and 1995.The Globalization of the Software Industry 5
Table 1.2
Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel: software industry growth and export shares
Data compiled from various sources.
III.Potential Determinants of the Success Stories
Export-Led Versus Development-Led Export Model
One difference between the growth patterns of India, Ireland, and
Israel (the 31s) vis-à-vis China and Brazil is noticeable. As column 3 in
table 1.2 shows, the export shares of the 31s are far higher than for
China and Brazil.8 However, the export share in China has grown sub-
stantially, from about 5 percent in 1999-2000 (Tschang and Xue 2005)
to 11 percent in 2002. In China, and perhaps in Brazil as well, exports
are based on competencies nurtured and developed by serving the do-
mestic market (see Boteiho et al. 2005).
Even among the 31s, we can see differences in the extent to which the
underlying growth model is export-led versus development-led. As
figure 1.1 shows, the export shares for the three are converging in the
late 1990s, but the starting points differ greatly. In the Indian software
industry, exports were a large share of sales from the early 1990s. In
1993, the first year for which Athreye (2005) reports export and total
sales data, the share was 59 percent; in 1991, it was 41 percent for the
domestic Irish industry and 20 percent for the Israeli industry. As
Breznitz (2005) notes, the Israeli industry was catalyzed by domestic
demand and became an international player only later. Although the
leading Irish firms have been export-oriented from the beginning, the
growth of the Irish industries owes a great deal to the activities of
MINJCs who located various software operations in Ireland.
The Indian software industry is perhaps the clearest example of
export-led growth. The impetus for growth initially took the form of
on-site projects, in which the Indian finns (and many U.S.-based firms
as well) literally rented out software programmers to work at the
Countries
Average growth
in the 1990s (%)
Exports as % of sales (2002
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Figure 1.1
India, Ireland, and Israel: software industry export shares 1991-2002.
Source: Arora and Gambardella (2005).
client's site and under the client's management. India-based firms
enjoyed a clear cost advantage over their U.S. rivals in the lower end
of software services, and they did not compete directly with market
leaders such as EDS, Computer Science Corporation, Anderson Con-
sulting (now Accenture), and IBM. With booming demand, Indian
firms had the opportunity to learn how to manage relatively large proj-
ects. Euro-conversion projects and projects involving the millenium
change (Y2K) were well suited for the kind of competencies and skills
that the Indian software industry had by then developed.
The domestic Irish industry shows a less pronounced initial depen-
dence on exports. Sands (2005) argues that MNCs were an early source
of demand for domestic software firms. As we also discuss in Arora,
Gambardella, and Torrisi (2004), many successful Irish software firms
started as programming houses for the subsidiaries of the MNCs in
the information technology (IT) sector, or as software application
developers for other non-IT firms, whether Irish or foreign-owned.
Interviews with several Irish software firms indicated that they saw
the MNCs both as a source of revenue and as providers of access to
foreign markets.
Of the 3Is, Israel relied the least on the export market at the outset of
its software industry, which makes this country the closest among theThe Globalization of the Software Industry 7
31s to the development-led export model. Breznitz (2005) argues that
"the rapid expansion of defense research and development (R&D) and
the fast accumulation of IT skills by both university graduates and
graduates of the military technological units created both local demand
for IT usage, the knowledge base to supply it, and a positive attitude
toward this nascent industry." In addition, the Israeli software indus-
try sits on the shoulders of a giant: The sizable Israeli IT hardware in-
dustry (55,000 employees in 2002), is a source of both demand and
expertise.
The latter point is important. Apart from India, which was interna-
tionally focused from the outset, the software industry in all the other
countries grew out of links with related sectors that were the sources
of competencies and provided the underlying demand as well. For ex-
ample, banking and telecommunications, along with customer elec-
tronics and retail automation, have been the principal sources of
domestic demand in China. The government has been another big
player, with national and regional governments often favoring domes-
tic vendors for various PC-based software, from the operating system
to applications software.9 Domestic demand also explains why Brazil
(rather than, for example, some of its neighbors) has become an impor-
tant software producer. Brazil has an uncommonly high share of IT
expenditures compared to its GDP. World Bank data cited by Botetho
et al. (2005) indicate that in 2000, Brazil spent 8.3 percent of its GDP on
IT, compared to 7.9 percent in the United States, 7.4 percent in Israel,
5.7 percent in China, and only 3.9 percent in India. The Brazil figure
stands out when compared to its neighbors Mexico (3.2 percent) and
Argentina (4.0 percent). Lead users such as banks have been central to
the growth of the Brazilian software industry. Similarly, the telecom
industry pushed the demand for communications software because of
the growth in the demand for cell phones. Public-sector demand,
exemplified by the installation of an electronic voting system, also
helped (Boteiho et al. 2005).
Human Capital and the Supp4, of Skills
One regularity among the 31s is that they exhibited an excess supply of
human capital in the 1980s and early 1990s, and specifically an excess
supply of engineering and technology graduates. The 31s are not the
countries with the largest proportion or even number of science and
engineering graduates. Rather, the excess supply was relative to the8 Arora and Gambardella
demand from manufacturing and related services. Simply put, the 31s
have produced more engineers than their hitherto lackluster industrial
sector could absorb.1° This fact is particularly relevant from about the
mid-1970s up until the late 1980s. During this time, these countries
grew only modestly while continuing to invest in science and engineer-
ing. Indeed, the average growth rate of GDP per capita for India be-
tween 1970 and 1990 was barely 2 percent per annum, while both
Israel and Ireland managed to grow at 2.4 percent and 2.9 percent, re-
spectively. In all three cases, however, this performance is lower than
the performance of peer countries. It masks the large variation from
one decade to another. In India, the 1970s were a period of very low
growth, while the 1980s could be called the lost decade for both Israel
and Ireland, a feature also reflected in the migration patterns to the
United States (discussed in Section V below).1'
In the more advanced countries and the rapidly growing Asian
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, science and
engineering graduates faced a high opportunity cost of working in
the software sector. Plentiful job opportunities in industry, in well-
established firms with good opportunities, mean that fewer entre-
preneurs set up software firms, and nascent software firms found it
difficult to attract talented engineers.
Why the 31s were abundant in technically skilled workers is not well
understood, but there is no doubt that having such abundance was
crucial for software success. Two issues must be considered here: the
first has to do with the level of supply of the relevant human capital.
The other issue is about the elasticity of the supply of graduates in the
countries that we are studying. The education institutions in all five
countries have responded with sizable increases in the number of grad-
uates as the demand for their services rose over the 1990s.
Sanctioned engineering capacity in India increased from around
60,000 in 1987-1988 to around 340,000 in 2003, and IT capacity has
increased from around 25,000 to nearly 250,000. It is likely, however,
that the actual number of IT admissions increased more slowly and
that the number of IT graduates increased even more slowly. NASS-
COM figures indicate that in India, the number of IT graduates
increased from 42,800 in 1997 to 71,000 in 2001. By comparison, the
number of IT graduates in the United States increased from 37,000 in
1998 to 52,900 in 2000. During this period, the IT workforce (which
does not directly correspond to IT degree holders) in the United States
was probably eight- to tenfold larger than the IT workforce in India.The Globalization of the Software Industry 9
Table 1.3
Distributions of European Union structural funds 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 (%)
Source: First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 1996 DG XVI EC Brussels, taken
from Sands (2005).
Other countries report a similar pattern. Tschang and Xue (2005) re-
port that in China, the number of IT graduates increased from 29,000 to
41,000 in 1999-2001. Botelho et al. (2005) note that the 18,000 IT gradu-
ates in Brazil in 2000 is a greater per-capita number than the numbers
in China and India. The latest Organization for Economic Cooperation
& Development (OECD) figures show that Ireland, with 34,000 gradu-
ates per year, now has the third highest share of adult population with
tertiary degrees (30 percent of which are in science and technology),
after Canada and the United States.
Such increases were the results of a mix of private and public efforts,
with the mix varying across countries. In Ireland, Israel, and China, the
bulk of the efforts were probably in the public sector. Table 1.3 shows
that Ireland differs markedly from comparable European countries
such as Greece and Portugal in investing a much larger share of Euro-
pean Union (EU) funds in human rather than physical capital.
In India, a substantial fraction of additional engineering capacity
created during the 1990s was created in the private sector. Figure 1.2
(based on data from the All India Council on Technical Education)
shows that the nearly 80 percent of the sanctioned intake capacity
for engineering students at the undergraduate level in 2003 (about
340,000) was in privately financed colleges (those that did not receive
grants from the government). The role of privately financed colleges,
the vast majority of which were created in the 1990s, is even more
marked if one looks only at IT-related engineering programs. Such
a rapid expansion of engineering training capacity has raised valid
Country
Human resources Infrastructure
1989-1993 1994-1999 1989-1993 1994-1999
Greece 25.6 24.6 40.9 45.9
Spain 24.2 28.4 54.0 40.4
Ireland 38.0 43.9 27.7 19.7
Portugal 26.1 29.4 29.2 29.7
Italy 21.6 21.4 38.7 29.8
Average for the 29.6 29.8 35.2 29.5
11 European Union





Share of privately financed colleges in Indian information technology capacity, by region
and year.
PNG refers to "private not granted," which are privately financed colleges.
Source: Based on data from the All India Council on Technical Education (AICTE). More
details are available on request.
concerns about the quality of the education and various other social
costs. Nonetheless, this supply response does indicate a flexibffity that
is rare in more advanced countries and also points to the perceived
returns on human capital.
The Diaspora
One peculiar but crucial element of the picture has been the role of
human capital flows. In addition to the human capital embedded in
exports, the 31s (and also China and Brazil) have directly supplied
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human capital, particularly to the United States. As a result, all the
countries have a substantial diaspora in the United States. Unlike the
embedded variety, the direct exports have different fiscal and eco-
nomic welfare implications.
A recent set of estimates provided by Carrington and Detragiache
(1998) indicate that the stock of highly skilled (more than thirteen years
of schooling) immigrants in the United States from China, India, and
Brazil were about 400,000, 300,000, and 60,000, respectively.12 Kapur
and McHale (2005) show that China ranks second only to India in the
number of H-lB visa petitions approved by the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). Indians alone account for more than 42
percent of all the H-lB visas approved in this period, over half of
which went for computer-related occupations. Independent estimates
of the U.S. IT workforce indicates that more than 15 percent of this
workforce is from Asia, of which slightly less than one-third are from
India. Thus, Indian-born workers account for about 5 percent of the IT
(mostly software) workforce of about 3.2 million (IT Workforce Update
2003).
The diaspora can provide links, act as reputational intermediaries,
and bring back valuable skifis and expertise when its members return
home. Despite much talk of IT professionals returning to India and
China, only in Ireland has the return of skified emigrants clearly
increased the domestic supply of skilled people (Kapur and McHale
2005). Similarly, Sands's (2005) survey of fifty-eight Irish software
entrepreneurs indicates that 66 percent of the founders of the Irish soft-
ware firms in her sample had worked abroad, 55 percent had worked
for multinational companies, and 74 percent of her companies had one
founder who worked abroad; her findings are largely consistent with
earlier findings (O'Gorman et al. 1997).
The Israeli case is similar to India. There is little evidence of system-
atic returns to Israel of Israelis who emigrated to the United States. At
the same time, no evidence points to a major skifi shortage in Israel.
The number of U.S. Ph.D.s awarded to Israeli nationals has remained
stable since the early 1990s. At the same time, the number of Ph.D. stu-
dents who plan to stay in the United States has increased slightly from
51 percent to 57 percent.
Despite the many potential benefits of a diaspora, the outflow of
skilled engineers, scientists, and doctors does represent a net loss of tal-
ent and of the considerable investment in training the emigrants. The
broad question about the net effects of the international mobffity of12 Arora and Gambardella
skilled people on the home country is a complex one and well beyond
the scope of this paper. Kapur and McHale (2005) conclude, however,
that the benefits from the diaspora outweigh the costs to the 31s for the
development of the software industry. In other words, setting aside the
question about whether the brain drain represented by the diaspora
was beneficial or not, the software industries of India, Ireland, and Is-
rael certainly benefited from the diaspora. Given the domestic market
orientation of the software industry in China and Brazil, the trade-off
has likely been less favorable.
Multinational Firms
One potential success factor that is often highlighted (even though it is
sometimes controversial) in analyses like ours is the role of the multi-
national companies (MNCs). MNCs have been a sizable presence in
the software industries of our countries. At the risk of some exaggera-
tion, one can say that MNCs went to Israel to do R&D, to India for
inexpensive skilled workers, and to Ireland to leverage tax incentives
and access the European market.'3
Giarratana, Torrisi, and Pagano (2005) show evidence of these differ-
ent patterns. They show that in Ireland, the entry of the IT MNCs pre-
cedes the rise of the domestic software industry. About 57 percent of
the MNCs in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
present in Ireland today entered the country before 1990, compared to
44 percent in India and 37 percent in Israel. The difference between Ire-
land and the other two I's is even more marked if one looks only at the
software MNCs. The shares are 55 percent for Ireland, and they drop
to 18 percent and 16 percent for India and Israel, respectively. Giarra-
tana, Torrisi, and Pagano (2005) find that while in Ireland the MNCs
have contributed to the initial push of the industry, Israel today has a
more active set of affiances and similar links between MNCs and do-
mestic software companies. Giarratana, Torrisi, and Pagano also find
that two-thirds of the existing ICT Irish patents assigned to local
IVINJCs were granted before 1994, compared to 37 percent for Israel
and 32 percent for India, which suggests that the MNCs have begun
to invest in R&D more recently in freland and India as compared to
Israel.'4 This finding is consistent with the view that in Ireland, the
MNCs played an important role in nurturing the rise of the domestic
firms when the industry started. By contrast, in Israel and in India, a
co-evolution of the entry of MNCs may have occurred while the indus-
try grew in the 1990s.The Globalization of the Software Industry 13
The available evidence also suggests that the IVINCs, especially Sie-
mens and Ericsson, are contributing to the formation of domestic corn-
petencies in Brazil (Boteiho et al. 2005). As in Brazil, the list of the top
ten to fifteen software companies in China include MNCs like IBM,
Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP. These firms play a major role in the na-
tional industry, especially as suppliers of their packaged products, but
their role in developing local competencies is less well understood.
IV.Has the Growth of the Indian Software Industry Been Good
for the United States?
To understand the impact of the rise of the emerging Indian software
industry, one must understand the nature of software engineering.
Specifically, software engineering work can be decomposed into sepa-
rate elements, and these do not have to be elements performed, at
least at a technical level, by engineers with the same firm or even in a
specific location. This basic insight about the nature of software
technology results in two important observations. First, while export-
oriented software has grown rapidly in these countries, the bulk of
export-oriented activities has involved software activities that are (1)
complementary to value-added activities done in the United States
and (2) at a lower level of the value chain (for example, maintenance
rather than initial product development). Second, though early
attempts to establish an international division of labor in software
have focused on software products and services that are likely to be
easily decomposable, the next generation of contracts is much more
likely to involve a higher level of integration between firms and loca-
tions. As a result, it should not be surprising if Indian software firms
start to establish facilities in the United States, and that leading U.S.
firms begin to locate at least some high-level engineering work in
emerging economy establishments. The remainder of this section
develops our basic insight about product modularity more carefully,
and then draws out the implication for the impact of these factors on
economic development in the United States and emerging economies.
Because outsourcing to India is the most significant in terms of em-
ployment, we focus on the Indian case to ifiustrate our argument.
We shall not enter the debate on whether the current job losses due
to growth in software production overseas will be quickly made up by
the creation of new opportunities at home. In our view, this debate
echoes earlier debates that appear to pit free trade against job losses iii
existing industries. The conclusion of most mainstream economists,14 Arora and Gambardella
with which we broadly agree, is that although free trade creates win-
ners and losers, the gains are greater than the losses, and thus, if the
winners can compensate the losers, free trade ought to be supported.
In this instance we think that policies such as retraining, that amelio-
rate the impact of such job losses, are beneficial.'5 It is also worth
pointing out that the total Indian software workforce engaged in
exports (estimated to be less than 400,000) is still a small fraction of the
more than 3.2 million software professionals in the United States. In-
deed, it is conceivable that the business cycle and technical progress in
software technologies, which are making possible the automation of
several tasks (such as some aspects of network and database adminis-
tration) and testing and code reuse, are more potent in this context
than the growth of the Indian software sector.
Thus, our focus is on a related question. Suppose that free trade is
superior because the United States is relinquishing activities that are
becoming commodities, and the United States no longer enjoys a com-
parative advantage. Some observers have speculated that this process
wifi lead the Indian software industry to become more sophisticated
and productive, so that the current set of activities in which the United
States currently dominates, namely, those intensive in design and in-
novation, will also be lost. A more extreme version of this view is that
R&D follows manufacturing, so that the offshoring of manufacturing
wifi quickly lead to R&D activities also moving offshore. Might there-
fore the offshoring of software coding and maintenance cause manu-
facturing to be followed soon by the more design-intensive activities
as well? The answer is simple. Such a succession is neither quick nor is
it inevitable. Indeed, strong reasons support the belief that the United
States wifi remain the center of software innovation for the foreseeable
future.
Though it is not easy to find the analog of production in software,
one can roughly divide software-related activities into design, coding,
and maintenance. Subject to the usual caveats when one draws such
sharp contrasts, one can think of coding and maintenance as analogous
to production. Much (though not all) of the software-related activity
carried out in the emerging economies is of the sort that complements
the activities carried out by software firms, substituting for the most
part activities carried out by the user sectors. For instance, NASSCOM
figures indicate that the three largest industry verticals in terms of the
share of export revenues for the Indian software industry are banking,
finance, and insurance (35 percent); manufacturing (12 percent), andThe Globalization of the Software Industry 15
telecom (12 percent).'6 Though at variance with the common percep-
tion that the software industry in India is the result of outsourcing by
U.S. software firms, the result should not be surprising. Software is a
general-purpose technology, with the result that user sectors account
for a substantial portion of software production. For instance, the latest
available data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) shows that
of the 3.2 million IT workers (including programmers, network admin-
istrators, and Information Security (IS) managers), only about 1 million
worked in the software industry itself. Thus, nearly two-thirds work in
the rest of the economy, especially insurance, banking, and finance.
In this sense, much of what is being offshored to India is the produc-
tion of software, rather than its design. We have already noted the low
revenue per employee in the Indian software industry, approximately
25 percent of that in the U.S. industry. Other evidence points in the
same direction as well. Arora et al. (2001) cite evidence from interviews
with Indian software firms between 1997 and 1999 and find that port-
ing existing applications from mainframe to client server, maintenance,
and enhancement of existing applications are examples of typical activ-
ities. The typical projects were small and technically undemanding,
and responses to a survey of Indian software firms indicated that the
most important project in 1998 had a median size of 150 labor-months.
Since then, the activities have become more sophisticated and larger in
scale (Athreye 2005). However, requirements analysis and design, not
to mention creation of new products and solutions, is stifi mostly the
province of the United States.
If India is taking up mostly production and maintenance jobs while
leaving the more innovative segments of the industry to the United
States, we then have to understand the implications of the physical
separation of these two activities. Note first that in many industries,
the locus of production and the locus of invention are physically sepa-
rated, particularly when the body of knowledge underlying the in-
vention process has a strong scientific basis. Building on earlier work
by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1996, 1997), Sutthiphisal (2003) studied
the location of production and invention in three different industries
during the second industrial revolution, (that is, the textile, shoe, and
electric industries). She finds that, in general, the locus of invention
did not shift with the locus of production as the latter moved to other
locations. She also finds that the link between location of production
and invention is weaker in the more science-based electric industry.
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R&D and production facffities by the Japanese MNCs in Europe. She
finds that in low and medium R&D industries, R&D labs are more
likely to be located close to production facifities than they are in more
R&D-intensive industries.
A physical separation between the design-intensive and production
activities comes with costs, including transaction and contracting costs,
and communication and management costs. Physical separation may
reduce the potential learning from production (Arrow 1962, Enos
1962) or from the feedback and links emphasized by Kline and Rosen-
berg (1986). Nonetheless, the lower cost of labor and the abffity to
work around the clock are important offsetting features. Perhaps the
least appreciated benefit is the greater project management and deliv-
ery abifities of Indian software firms, abilities they have acquired over
the last decade. Competition among Indian firms has meant that the
benefits have accrued largely to the customers of Indian software
firms, that is, to American firms. This point is obvious when stated be-
cause it is a benefit of free trade. Less obvious is the implication that
firms from countries such as Japan, Germany, and France benefit far
less. Because the principal competition for U.S. firms is still from these
countries, important strategic benefits also accrue. Simply put, by out-
sourcing, U.S. firms are gaining important advantages over European
and Japanese competitors in terms of lower costs, greater flexibffity,
and shorter product development cycles.
With globalization of production, it is perhaps inevitable that com-
peting regions and countries wifi be able to learn and improve their
productivity and challenge the leader. The leader must make sustained
investments in innovation. Evidence about these patterns is offered by
the long-term history of the U.S. chemical industry. The U.S. chemical
industry grew through technology borrowed mainly from Germany
and the United Kingdom. World War II and the shift from coal- to oil-
based feedstocks marked the rise of the United States as the technology
leader, albeit some time after it had emerged as the leading chemical-
producing nation. Over time, chemical production has grown else-
where, particularly in economies such as Taiwan and Korea, and since
the 1980s, in China, India, and the Middle East. As we discuss in Arora
and Gambardella (1998), since the 1950s, the U.S. chemical industry
has developed an independent sector of specialized engineering firms
(SEFs) that supplied new process technologies via licenses and chemi-
cal process engineering services to the rest of the world. In so doing,
they nurtured the international competitors of the U.S. chemical firms
as much as they nurtured the U.S. chemical companies.17The Globalization of the Software Industry 17
Can the United States specialize and keep its comparative advantage
in the higher end industrial activities? The starting point for this dis-
cussion is to note that two key resources are required to remain the
center of innovation in software: access to talented designers, software
engineers, and programmers; and proximity to several large and tech-
nically sophisticated users. The United States dominates on both counts.
As noted in Section II, emerging software-producing regions are
leveraging their abundance of relatively underused human capital,
especially engineers and IT professionals. The United States also pro-
duces abundant human capital, but that is not all. The very same pro-
cesses of globalization that have led to the growth of software
overseas have also worked to attract the best and brightest to the
United States. Thanks to the size and the openness of its culture and
economy, the United States has had no difficulty in attracting talent,
providing it with a strong advantage over potential competitors such
as Japan or Western Europe.
Even more prominent is the relationship with users. New software
applications depend largely on knowledge about demand and about
the use of the applications. This dependence is apparent, for exam-
ple, in telecommunications and semiconductors, where the software
needed to design the chip is part of the product itself. More generally,
a substantial fraction of software is used for running businesses and
business processes. Hence, proximity to business activities is crucial
for innovation in this industry, which consists of solutions to emerging
business problems, often specific to particular industrial sectors such as
banking, finance, and retail, as well as telecommunications and manu-
facturing. Indeed, the development of new commercial applications or
solutions is a special comparative advantage of the United States.
India's economy is growing and we expect that sophisticated domestic
demand for software wifi eventually rise in India. At present, however,
the U.S. lead is overwhelming.
As was true of human capital, globalization may reinforce this lead
because we find that innovative companies from Israel, Ireland, and
even India, are likely to move their operations to the United States to
be closer to their users. Sometimes venture capitalists also push for
such move. Although firms do not have to be based in the United
States to tap its equity markets, a strong presence in the United States
does help a great deal. Similarly, other intermediating institutions
such as legal services and large and functioning labor markets are
other important sources of advantage that the United States enjoys,
and these are not likely to be eroded soon.18 Arora and Gambardella
Countertendencies are also at work. If Indians have a preference for
staying in their home country, the cost of scientists and engineers wifi
be lower in India, so that the cost of R&D activities that are human
capitalintensive and relatively less intensive in physical infrastructure
wifi be lower. Anecdotal evidence suggests that India is viewed as
an attractive location for certain types of R&D activities, although
anecdotal evidence also suggests that U.S. firms are not locating
mission-critical activities in India, nor are they moving activities at the
technological frontier.
V.Is the Globalization of Software Beneficial for India?
The other natural twist to the question that we asked in the previous
section is whether the growth of software, and particularly its global-
ization, has had net benefits for India.'8 In addition to the standard
benefits from specialization according to comparative advantage, one
must also reckon the benefits from increasing returns to scale and
from possible productivity increases as Indian firms learn and gain ex-
perience. In this respect, it was a crucial strategy for India to specialize
in activities that were complementary with the international industry.
If India had instead moved up quickly to higher-value-added prod-
ucts, as many had suggested (perhaps because of the common belief
that moving up the value chain is the only way to sustain an industry),
it would most likely have conflicted with the United States. Ireland
and Israel did face this problem, especially during the downturn of the
international IT demand after 2000. Because software product develop-
ment was more important in these countries than it was in India, it
was natural that the reduced international demand for IT had a bigger
impact on them. Indeed, as we showed in Arora and Gambardella
(2005), the performance of the Irish and Israeli software industries fal-
tered in 2001-2002, with reduced profitability and employment for the
first time since the early 1990s. By contrast, the growth of the Indian
software industry slowed, but only to about 20 percent per year in this
period.
To summarize, because of the opportunities created by the interna-
tional demand, India has had obvious benefits from its rising software
skills. First and foremost, the growth of software has contributed in a
nontrivial way to the growth of the country as whole. The growth of
the software industry has provided the basis for the growth of a new
entrepreneurial model, which in turn has had spillovers for related
activities, such as business services and even some type of R&D tasks.The Globalization of the Software Industry 19
Table 1.4
Selected foreign-born populations age 25 and over in the United States
Source: Kapur and McHale (2005). Original data from the March 2001 Current Popula-
tion Survey of the United States.
Table 1.5
Selected foreign-born populations in the United States by year of entry
Source: Kapur and McHale (2005). Original data from the March 2001 Current Popula-
tion Survey of the United States.
One feature provides pause for thought, namely, the observed pat-
terns of international migration of human capital. As tables 1.4 and
1.5 show, the number of Indian-born residents in the United States
increased nearly threefold between 1990 and 2000, with over 80 per-
cent of the Indian-born residents having tertiary-level education.
Brazilian- and Chinese-born residents have lower levels of tertiary edu-
cation than do Indians, but it is stifi above 50 percent, and these levels
have also increased rapidly in the last decade. To put these figures in
perspective, around 50 percent of the native-born adult population in
the United States has tertiary education, second only to Canada.
Such large-scale migration of human capital has conflicting welfare
implications. To the extent that the increase in the U.S. labor supply
curbs the U.S. wages, native-born workers have lower welfare than
they would without international labor mobifity. By contrast, the In-






% entering mary ary tiary
1990 2000 changepost-1990 % % %
India 304 837 175 55 5 15 80
Brazil 54 154 186 49 9 36 55
China 405 847 109 66 20 26 54
Indian-born Irish-born Israeli-born
Before 1960 1% 32% 4%
1960-1969 3% 19% 1%
1970-1979 14% 8% 28%
1980-1989 24% 23% 35%
1990-1995 23% 13% 18%
1996-2001 36% 5% 14%20 Arora and Gambardella
does the salary of the workers who stay in India (or at least it does not
fall as much as it might have given the large increases in the supply of
Indian IT workers). The standard argument, however, also implies that
because the migration follows more productive opportunities in the
United States, the re-allocation of Indian workers to the United States
implies a higher combined output of the two countries than if migra-
tion did not take place. Hence, proper redistribution policies, or the ex-
tent to which Indian workers ship some of their rents back to India (for
example, links to Indian software companies, returnees, consumption
of other Indian commodities), may in the end enhance the overall
value for India as well.
Yet if externalities exist in software production (because of spifiovers
or scale economies) associated with the agglomeration of human capi-
tal, the picture could be different. Such externalities are plausible in
activities like software. With externalities, it is possible that as more
Indian IT engineers flow to Sificon Valley or other U.S. locations spe-
cializing in IT, the productivity of these workers may even increase, at
least until congestion effects overwhelm them. The increase in produc-
tivity would then encourage more migration from India. In addition, if
the Indian industry suffers from reduced spifiovers or lower-scale
economies because of the outflow of skilled workers, Indian software
salaries may not rise fast enough to match U.S. salaries. This situation
may imply persistence differences in salary that feed a continuous out-
ward flow of software professionals from India to the United States.'9
The available evidence suggests, however, that in fact Indian soft-
ware salaries have increased faster than those in the United States.
Athreye (2005) presents data that suggest U.S. salaries for various soft-
ware occupations such as programmer, project leader, quality assur-
ance specialist, and systems designer increased by about 21 percent
between 1995 and 1999, and Indian salaries increased by nearly 45
percent.
In sum, while the migration of Indian talent to the United States can
be a problem for India if externalities are involved in these activities, it
is India's abffity to sustain a continuous flow of human capital that
may turn this situation into a major opportunity. As people move but
are replaced by new workers, the flow of workers to the United States
feeds its software industry with talented programmers and motivated
entrepreneurs. Indeed, the main Indian (or Chinese) resource could
easily be its academic system, which supplies human capital to the
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VI.Software: A Model for Other Emerging Economies?
The spectacular growth of software in India, Ireland, and Israel raises
the natural question, Are other developing countries taking up a simi-
lar opportunity? We believe that potential emulators wifi likely find it
difficult to replicate two central features of the successful growth of
the software industry in the 31s: the excess supply of skills and the
international connections.
Software is labor-intensive, but it does require skilled arid trained
labor. Indeed, the software industry makes little use of workers with
modest education and training, in marked contrast to large-scale man-
ufacturing operations. Most developing regions have abundant labor,
but rarely abundant skilled labor. Not only could this feature hamper
the growth of a software industry, such a growth may even increase
inequality by greatly increasing demand for the small segment of the
population that is highly skilled and educated and leave almost
untouched the rest. Indeed, the growth of the software industry draws
away skilled engineers from other sectors. This trend may not only in-
crease inequality but may also reduce rather than increase total output
if the growing middle-class incomes are primarily directed at imports
(see Gambardella and IJlph 2003).
Several non-G7 countries have a substantial number of underem-
ployed college graduates. However, few are English-speaking coun-
tries with a diaspora or other means of linking to their potential export
markets. Therefore, it is unlikely that others can replicate a success of
similar proportions, even more so because they would be playing
catchup.
Nonetheless, software has thrived in a few regions in the world, but
not at the rates that we have observed for our 31s. As we discussed
earlier, and in greater detail in Arora and Gambardella (2005), other
successful examples in software include Finland and South Korea. To
a lesser extent, Hungary and the Czech Republic are also showing
some signs of vitality in this area. Broadly speaking, all these cases fit
our model. They all have a relatively higher share of educated popula-
tion compared to their level of development. At the same time, they do
not have a wide and diversified industrial basis, which implies that the
opportunity cost for these people to work in the software industry is
not significant. Furthermore, domestic sources exist for the formation
of software competencies, like the electronics industry in Korea, the
telecom leader Nokia in Finland, or some investments in ICT and elec-
tronics foreign firms in Hungary and the Czech Republic.22 Arora and Gambardella
More generally, one can list the exportable lessons for other emerg-
ing economies. First and foremost, our cases have underscored the im-
portance of openness. Export markets can facilitate scales of operation
and opportunities for learning that would not be possible otherwise.
As we have emphasized, however, openness means more than free
trade. It includes openness to MNCs. In Ireland, for instance, MNCs
have been important as sources of demand and competencies, and in
India, they appear to have helped in legitimizing India as a source of
software. Doubtless, relying on export markets also makes one more
vulnerable to the vagaries of the business cycle and policies in those
markets, policies over which one can have little control. Openness
also has other costs. Domestic firms may be squeezed out of learning
opportunities, and experienced managers and engineers may be lured
away to jobs in the developed countries, as in India or Israel. Such mo-
bffity of people, which is an important component of openness, can be
turned into an advantage because ethnic links often underpin im-
portant trade links (Rauch 2001), and in a human capital-intensive in-
dustry such as software, such links are vital. If conditions are right,
some of the emigrants may also return, as was the case in Ireland,
bringing with them valuable skills and experience, both technical and
managerial.
A second exportable lesson is that the upgrading to overcome the in-
evitable erosion of initial competitive advantage can take many forms.
In particular, it does not have to take the form of moving up the tech-
nology ladder. For instance, many observers of the Indian software in-
dustry have noted that with the growth of the industry, the advantage
of low wages would decline. Many even characterized the growth of
the Indian software industry as unsustainable unless firms began to in-
vest in R&D to undertake sophisticated product development. The pre-
scription that emerged was that Indian firms would have to move
rapidly from programming to higher-value activities such as design
and product development (Heeks 1996, DaCosta 1998).20 Such recom-
mendations are often part of a broader mind-set, wherein progress
in technology-intensive industries must necessarily take the form
of moving up the technology ladder, to parallel (if not imitate) the
activities undertaken in the rich countries. Indeed, policy makers in
developing countries often point with pride to the technological
accomplishments achieved in their countries, treating them as indica-
tors of success. Considerable pride is based on the formation of na-
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produce technically sophisticated products, regardless of their com-
mercial feasibility.
The lessons from the Indian experience are the opposite. To be sure,
in recent years the leading Indian firms have managed to take on a
larger range of activities. But for the most part, developing new prod-
ucts or undertaking high-level design has not been the principal means
of offsetting the wage advantage. Rather, Indian firms upgraded their
abffity to take on and manage larger projects. Instead of moving
aggressively into product design, they focused on performing lower-
end functions such as maintenance and support. This strategy also fits
theoretical models of the advantages from international trade, such as
the one by Gomory and Baumol (2000). In this respect, the lower-end
activities undertaken by Indian firms involve a steady and predictable,
although not as lucrative, stream of revenues because maintenance
contracts are typically three to five years in duration. This focus lever-
aged the capabffities that Indian firms had developed, which was to
manage projects with large teams of skified people.
Conversely, most of the early forays of Indian software firms into
product development did not pay off. We do observe other Indian
software firms (mostly later entrants that do not have the same possi-
bilities in software services) investing in developing products for tar-
geted niche markets as a means of differentiating themselves. Some of
these firms are likely to succeed. Even if they fail, however, it is un-
likely to shake the foundations on which the Indian software industry
has grown.
The Indian experience can be compared to the development-led ex-
port model of Brazil and China. Growth based on domestic demand
can give rise to development processes that help firms move down
their learning curve, even though the drawback of any strategy that
relies too strongly on the domestic market is that too great a focus can
be placed on the idiosyncratic needs of local users, as the Brazilian case
suggested. The Chinese strategy, which is essentially one of import
substitution, is even less promising in terms of the export markets in
the West. It may prove of some value, however, in terms of the East
Asian export markets of Japan and Korea.
Finally, our case studies highlight the importance of entrepreneur-
ship. In each of the countries, firms have sprung up to exploit the
opportunities opened up by the growth of demand for software.
However, these firms have not formed in a vacuum. Frequently, re-
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entrepreneurs and managers. hi some cases, particularly in freland and
India, nationals working and trained overseas have played an impor-
tant role as well. For countries wishing to develop their own software
industry, a key question is, Do they have the related industries to act
as the nurseries for future software entrepreneurs and managers?
But our studies also provide a message of hope in this regard. For
India and Ireland, and to a lesser extent for Israel, entrepreneurship in
high-tech industries had hitherto been the exception, not the norm.
These countries had mostly lacked a culture of risk taking that one
takes for granted in the United States. Financial institutions and capital
markets were not set up to promote entrepreneurship, and few role
models were available. In India, commercial success had hitherto
required preferential access to government permits and capital markets
to exploit the protected India market. In Ireland, few believed that Irish
scientists and engineers could develop and commercialize world-scale
technology until companies like lona or Baltimore proved them wrong.
Quite simply, the elasticity of entrepreneurship has proven to be
high. For policy makers in developing countries, this should be wel-
come news. What is required is not special programs to encourage
entrepreneurship but a clear opportunity and an economic environ-
ment that miniintizes legal barriers to entry and exit. For software, this
welcome news must be tempered. Not only is the sustained boom
of the 1990s unlikely to repeat itself in the near future, but even if such
a boom arose, newcomers would have to contend with established
incumbents.
VII.Implications for Policy
The previous three sections hold specific implications for effective
policy in both the United States and the emerging economies. The
implications for U.S. policy are twofold. On balance, the rise of soft-
ware services in emerging economies is a boon for the U.S. economy.
Calls for restricting outsourcing are likely to harm the competitiveness
of U.S. firms and reduce efficiency. Because equity is often sacrificed at
the altar of efficiency in economic analysis, however, we stress that
policies for mitigating the impact on software professionals is not only
fair but, more important, upgrading the technical skifis of the U.S.
workforce is important also for sustaining the U.S. technological lead-
ership. The U.S. leadership in technology has been based in some
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In the short term, concerns over terrorism and anaemic job growth
now threaten one of the most potent sources of U.S. advantage: its
open economy and culture. Though such threats are perhaps not se-
vere and the United States is likely to remain the primary destination
for emigrants with training and drive (often educated at publicex-
pense in their home countries), policy must account for the growing
attraction of other economies. In terms of the emerging economies,our
stories have shown the benefts of organizing policy toencourage
economic growth based on the development of these types of in-
dustries around an investment in human capital;openness to interna-
tional trade, investment, and competition; and domestic economic
liberalization.
The implications for technology policy are more diffuse. Israel and
Ireland are instances where enlightened government policy did help
the software industry. Even here, the evidence for the efficacy of
targeted sector-specific policies is limited at best. Israel's software in-
dustry benefited from general support for R&D and human capital
development, and from the earlier growth of the computer hardware
and electronics industries. The benefits of government venture capital
funding and incubators, and in particular, whether the benefits Out-
weigh the costs, are difficult to assess. Ireland's welcome for foreign
direct investment was aimed at boosting employment rather thanpro-
moting software. Software did benefit directly because these MNCs
were initial sources of demand and sources of competencies. We spec-
ulate that the indirect effects, including the training ofmanagers and of
legitimizing Ireland as a place to develop software, wifiprove to be
more important.
The Indian case shows that a weak and inefficient bureaucratic
structure works best when it attempts not to do too much. It also
shows the virtues of decentralization. Competitionamong Indian
states to develop software has obviously kept political excesses in
check and has focused government policy on addressing issues such
as physical infrastructure instead of attempting to channel the industry
into high-tech and high-value-added directions, or attempting toregu-
late entry and entrepreneurship. This situation is also an instance of the
political economy of success: the success of the software industry has
provided celebrity status for Indian software entrepreneurs and politi-
cal clout for the industry, which the industry has used to push forsen-
sible tax and capital market policies (Arora, Gambardella, and Torrisi
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VIII.Conclusion
In the traditional neoclassical model, capital and labor are symmetric.
Countries with relatively abundant labor supplies can just as easily
specialize in labor-intensive sectors and adopt labor-intensive tech-
nologies as countries with abundant capital, who can specialize in cap-
ital-intensive sectors. As we all know, however, labor and capital have
been anything but symmetrical. Poor countries have had to follow
in the footsteps of richer countries, moving from agriculture to manu-
facturing, moving from labor-intensive to capital-intensive sectors.
Might software, with its dependence on human capital but relatively
low intensity in physical capital, offer a new way for labor-abundant
countries? Can developing countries leverage their abundant labor
endowments to target human capitalintensive service sectors for
exports and growth, without having to invest the large amounts of
capital that manufacturing requires?
It is true that software, particularly software services, do allow a coun-
try to participate in the high-tech sector with only a limited physical
infrastructure. However, even a successful software industry is likely to
accbunt for a small share of GDP and employment. The software indus-
tries in the countries we have studied, except Ireland, account for at best
2 to 3 percent of their respective GDPs and an even smaller fraction of
the total labor force, so that the direct impact on economic growth is
likely to be small. Hence, we turn to examine the indirect effects.
One possible set of indirect effects works through the links to other
sectors. Some authors have argued that software is to the knowledge-
based economy what capital goods were to manufacturingan input
source whose importance for productivity and innovation wasfar
greater than was reflected in revenues or share of GDP. Software
does supply basic inputs to almost every industrial sector. Better soft-
ware would therefore increase productivity acrossthe board. Though
attractive, this argument has a problem. Software is internationally
traded and it is not clear why a country, particularly one not at the
leading edge of technology, could not use software developed else-
where. A domestic software sector that can tailor software to local
requirements at lower costs may have some advantages. However,
this must be weighed against the possible lower efficiency in develop-
ing software domestically. The net effect of all these factors is that
having a domestic software industry provides at best a modest con-
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ering the potential effects on the large set of domestic user firms and
industries.
Success at an export-oriented industry also has spillovers for other
industries in terms of enhanced reputation. China's initial success in
producing and exporting light manufactures of all kinds has earned it
the reputation of being a desirable location for all manufacturing. Con-
versely, years ago, Japanese automakers had to fight the reputation for
shoddy quality that its early exports of light manufactures had earned.
Today, India enjoys a reputation for service quality largely because of
its software industry. It is no accident that it is the favored destination
for other service exports, ranging from call centers to customercare,
medical transcription, and high-end R&D services.
We believe more potent indirect effects work more subtly. Most of
the successful software firms in the 31s, in modeling themselves after
their Silicon Valley counterparts, have also stressed shareholder value,
and responsible and transparent corporate governance and accounting.
Though American corporate governance is under attack, and with
justification, it is likely superior to the practices of the traditional firms
in many developing economies, which frequently resemble family fief-
doms more than shareholder-owned corporations. The software indus-
try can act as an exemplar of a new business model that features flatter
organizations, individual incentives, competition, and export orienta-
tion, particularly for other sectors that rely on skilled workers.
But perhaps most important of all, the success of an export-oriented
software industry can show to potential entrepreneurs what is possible
with talent, luck, and hard work. In Ireland, the success of the software
industry provided others with the confidence that Irish high-tech firms
can compete with any in the world. In India, software was almost the
first instance where wealth was created honestly and legally, and
more important, visibly so. Before the development of the software in-
dustry, wealth came either from breaking laws or at least bending
them to one's convenience, using existing political and economic
power. Partly as a result, commercial success had invited envy, cyni-
cism, and even outright hostility, and only rarely admiration. While
envy and hostility are not gone by any means, there is much more of
admiration and, more important, a desire for imitation. Ofcourse,
entrepreneurs can succeed only if other conditions are also present.
Some, such as international links and a supply of skills, are not easy to
create. However, the task for any underdog region is probably easier
today than at any other time in the past.28 Arora and Gambardella
Policy makers in the United States should not view the growth of
underdog regions with fear. Instead, the U.S. economy will broadly
benefit from their growth. Over time, the growth of software and other
high-teclmology industries in these economies may raise other chal-
lenges. U.S. technological leadership rests in part on the continued po-
sition of the United States as the primary destination for highly trained
and skilled scientits and engineers from the world over. Though this
position is likely to persist for some time, the increasing attractiveness
of foreign emerging economy destinations is a long-term concern for
continued U.S. technological leadership.
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While the 31s stand somewhat separateiy because of a set of peculiar features (for ex-
ample, the diaspora, English-speaking human capital, large export shares), the patterns
observed for China and Brazil bear greater similarities with other non-C? countries. For
example, in South Korea too the software industiy has relied mainly on the domestic
market and on spifiovers from leading industries like hardware and electronics.
The Irish MNC sales are most likely inflated by accounting devices guided by the
substantial tax concessions offered by the country. Indeed, the MNCs in Ireland have
employment levels comparable to that of the indigenous firms (15,300 and 12,600,
respectively, in 2002), while their sales are over eight times as much. Because they mostly
adjust their products for local markets in Ireland, not design them, this gap must arise
mainly from accounting reasons, not superior value added.
This figure excludes what NASSCOM calls IT-enabled services, such as call centers
and help desk operations, which employ 160,000. Another 260,000 software professionals
are estimated to work in what NASSCOM calls user organizations.
Note that about two-thirds of all software occupations are not in the IT sectors. Thus,
the true number of software workers in the United States is probably closer to 3 million
(see also IT Workforce Update 2003).
It is likely that in these countries, the true size of software production is even higher
because a large number of firms not in the software business, such telecommunications,
banking and finance, and large retail and banking firms, produce significant amounts of
software for their internal use.
The GDP shares of Brazil, China, and the domestic Irish software industry are indeed
higher than other G7 countries, like the United Kingdom (1 percent) or Italy (0.8 percent),
and they are comparable to the figure for all the G7 countries taken as a whole.The Globalization of the Software Industry 29
There are no specific figures for the creation of new software firms in China or Israel.
However, the existing scattered accounts support the idea of high rates of entry into the
software industry in both countries.
As shown in Sands (2005), the software MNCs in Ireland exported 95 percent of their
sales in 2002, and this percentage has mostly been above 90 percent since 1991.
For example, Saxenian (2003) reports that the Beijing municipal government and the
Guangdong provincial government recently required that all their departments used a
Chinese-language office software package, WPS2000, rather than Microsoft Office 2000,
in spite of its lower technical quality.
In the Israeli case, the economic crisis in the early 1980s and the growing military affi-
ance with the United States after the 1973 war led to a significant downsizing in the de-
fense industry. The most notable instance was the decision to stop the development of
the latest fighter jet (the Lavi). The result was that thousands of highly trained andexpe-
rienced engineers became available Breznitz (2005) also notes that generous redundancy
packages became seed capital for many of these would-be entrepreneurs.
A regression of the stock of scientists and engineers on per-capita GDP and other fac-
tors (not reported here) showed that the 31s all had actual stocks that were higher than
the predicted stocks of scientists and engineers.
Brazifian emigration of skified workers, though lower in absolute volume, are com-
parable with India and China when expressed as a percentage of the stock of skilled pop-
ulation. The small absolute size of the stock of Brazilian immigrants in the United States
has meant, however, that little is known about their role in the growth of the Brazifian
software industry.
In time, they also established software development and R&D facilities in Ireland.
Of course, India is too large a market to ignore for software products, and so firms like
Oracle and Microsoft also came to sell in India.
Giarratana et al. (2005) confirm the stronger links between domestic and multina-
tional ICT firms in Israel by using patent citation data. More cross-cites occur among the
two types of firms in Israel than occur in the other two countries.
On the debate about the outcomes for the United States of the outsourcing game
in software and IT more generally, see Mann (2003) and the McKirisey Global Industry
report (MGI 2003).
http://www.nasscom.org/artdisplay.asp?cat_id314 (last viewed on 2 May, 2004).
Even if the U.S. chemical suppliers were hurt by the international diffusion of tech-
nology, U.S. engineering firms and contractors have benefited. Indeed, the United States
is stifi the world leader in the provision of chemical process technology and engineering
services.
Once again, we focus on India for brevity and emphasis.
The problem would be even more severe with some sort of selection, that is, if those
who move are the more productive workers who can take greater advantage of the
opportunities that open up in more advanced nations. Indeed, Europe faces this problem
today. The European brain drain to the United States does imply a possible deficit of
highly skified people. Yet a major difference between Europe and India is that India can30 Arora and Gambardella
produce human capital at a substantially higher rate in large measure because of a much
younger population, so India can sustain a net outward migration for much longer.
20. This recommendation was frequently, accompanied by a complementary recommen-
dation for firms to focus on the domestic market, which would provide the initial de-
mand for more sophisticated products and services. Arora et al. (2001) conclude that the
competencies developed in the domestic Indian market were not helpful for exports.
Athreye's study of CITIL (now i-Flex), a Citibank subsidiary, indicates that the Indian
market could provide a fruitful learning base for products (in this case, a back-end bank-
ing product) that could be successfully exported. The study also makes clear, however,
that this strategy depends on several conditions for its success. In this case, Citibank's in-
ternal use of the product (albeit in India and other developing country markets) provided
important legitimization. CulL's strategy was to focus initially on other developing
country markets, particularly in the British Commonwealth, avoiding head-to-head com-
petition with incumbent producers in developed countries, most of which were not large
established firms. Only after succeeding in the export markets did CITIL enter the devel-
oped country markets.
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